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CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND MARGINALITY
KENNETH L. KARST*
For two decades most Americans have understood that the con-
ditions of human life among the marginalized poor in our urban
ghettos amount to a national disgrace. This Article explores some
of the constitutional dimensions of those conditions. Our starting
point is the substantive center of the fourteenth amendment: the
principle of equal citizenship.1 Under that principle, every individ-
ual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society
as a respected, responsible, and participating member. Stated neg-
atively, the principle forbids the organized society to treat people
as members of an inferior or dependent caste, or as
nonparticipants.
Equal citizenship has long been an American ideal. As a princi-
ple of constitutional law, however, it did not emerge until the
struggle to save the Union was transformed into a struggle to rid
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B., University of California,
Los Angeles, 1950; LL.B., Harvard, 1953. This article is an expanded version of the James
Gould Cutler Lecture, delivered at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary, on March 24, 1988. Much of the article will appear as part of a book, BELONGING
TO AMERICA. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming January 1989). For
their helpful comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Catherine Hancock, Joel Han-
dler, and Margaret Stevenson.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1977).
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the nation of slavery and its system of racial caste. After Recon-
struction, both Congress and the courts largely ignored the equal
citizenship principle until it was revived in the middle of our cen-
tury. The revival, led by the Supreme Court, was the nation's re-
sponse to Jim Crow in the South and to Jim Crow's relatives in the
North and West. This familiar learning is repeated here only as a
reminder that the fourteenth amendment's main target is the
stigma of racial caste. Whatever else the amendment may mean, it
forbids a system of group subordination founded on race and bear-
ing the look of permanence. A live example in today's America is
the ghetto.
Americans have always embraced the ideal of equal citizenship.
Yet we have also tolerated the subordination of groups: not just
racial segregation, but such things as religious tests for political
participation, discrimination against the foreign-born, and the vir-
tual exclusion of women from public life. Writing during the Sec-
ond World War, Gunnar Myrdal called the race-relations aspects
of this ambivalence an "American dilemma."2 He saw that white
Americans were genuinely devoted to the nation's individualistic
and egalitarian ideals; yet they also accepted the systematic denial
of black people's equality and individuality2 Similar paradoxes
have attended our society's treatment of other groups defined by
sex, religion, language, sexual orientation, and mental or physical
handicap.
How have successive generations of Americans managed to live
with this incongruity between their egalitarian ideals and their be-
havior? The technique is simple enough: define the community's
public life-or the community itself-in a way that excludes the
subordinated groups. The inclination to exclude is not innate; it
arises in the acculturation that forms individual self-definition out
of attachment to one's own group and separation from other
groups. Rodgers and Hammerstein got it right: "You've got to be
carefully taught."4 Culture shapes identity by contrasting "our"
beliefs and behavior, which are examples to be followed, with those
2. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA. THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
(1944).
3. Id. at 84-88.
4. R. Rodgers & 0. Hammerstein, South Pacific 136 (1949).
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of the Other,5 which must be avoided. Among full members of the
community, the ideal of equality prevails; as to outsiders, the issue
of equality seems irrelevant. Equality and belonging are in-
separably linked. To define the scope of the ideal of equality in
America is to define the boundaries of the national community.
A core value of citizenship is responsibility. If today's Americans
are true to their tradition of equal opportunity, they will see to it
that our marginalized poor are afforded a real chance to partici-
pate in the community of equal citizens. Those of us who never
have to think about whether we belong have the responsibility to
ensure that no one goes hungry in America; that the children of
the marginalized poor receive effective education, not warehousing;
and that people who want work can find jobs and training to per-
form them.
The argument is simple and straightforward. Yet, such argu-
ments do not typically find approval in our society. Among a "peo-
ple of plenty"' the poor are apt to be seen as deviant, as outsiders.
Our acculturation to the norms of individualism uses poverty as a
negative identity: don't be a loser; work hard, so you won't be poor.
Believing in America as a land of opportunity, we are ready to view
the poor as people who deserve their poverty because they have
chosen not to try. "The availability of work for every ablebodied
person who really wants a job is one of the enduring myths of
American history."'7 The able bodied see pauperism-the failure to
be self-sustaining-as a moral failing. The long association of so-
cial welfare programs with the control of deviance," and the visible
departure by many poor people from middle-class norms of dress,
speech, and day-to-day behavior, reinforce the characterization of
the non-working poor as the Other.9
5. S. DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX Xi (1949). Sinone deBeauvoir seems to borrow the
term "Other" from Sartre, who borrowed it from Heidegger. See K. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming January 1989).
6. D. PoTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER
(1954).
7. M KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA
6 (1986). The enduring power of the myth is confirmed by modern survey research. See J.
FEAGIN, SUBORDINATING THE PooR WELFARE AND AMERICAN BELIEFS ch. 4 (1975).
8. Handler, Book Review, 15 REv. IN AM. HIsT. 394 (1987).
9. See Main, Helping and Hating the Homeless, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1987, at 39.
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Perceptions of the poor are complicated by associations between
poverty and race. Most American blacks are not poor, and at any
particular moment a majority of America's poor are white. Yet
white families tend to move in and out of poverty, and their pov-
erty generally does not persist from one generation to the next."
The overwhelming majority of marginalized poor, who stay poor
and whose children likely will stay poor, are members of racial or
ethnic minorities, or women heading single parent homes, or
both." The picture of the poor as the Other, who do not really
belong, is thus intensified. This view translates into public policy,
which in turn plays its own role in separating the poor-especially
the female and minority poor-from the rest of us. The separation
of paupers, so evident in the different treatment afforded to need-
based welfare programs and to middle-class programs like Social
Security, 2 is modern America's inheritance from Victorian Eng-
land's reform of the poor law.
For the English reformers of 1834, one central purpose of requir-
ing paupers to live in the workhouse was to stigmatize them. Their
physical separation marked them as outcasts, people who lived
outside the boundaries of a society defined by the market. 13 Today
the workhouse is behind us,' 4 but the separation and the stigma
remain. Some people are defined as full members of our commu-
nity, and some are not. We concentrate the poor physically, by lo-
10. See S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR 7 (5th ed. 1985); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1987, at 443 (1986); W. WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 174-77 (1987);
Wilson, Cycles of Deprivation and the Underclass Debate, 59 SOC. SERV. REV. 541, 548
(1985); Wilson & Aponte, Urban Poverty, 11 ANNUAL REV. Soc. 231, 242-43 (1985).
11. W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 26-29; cf. D. PEARCE & H. McADOO, WOMEN AND CHIL-
DREN ALONE IN POVERTY (1981).
12. M. KATZ, supra note 7, at 238-39, 266-68; HANDLER, supra note 8, at 396-97. Consider
this example: In 1984 the amount budgeted for federal spending on the elderly (mainly
Social Security and Medicare) was six times greater than the amount budgeted for spending
on children (AFDC, Head Start, food stamps, child health, child nutrition, aid to educa-
tion). Preston, Children and the Elderly in the United States, ScI. AM., Dec. 1984, at 44-45.
13. J. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR 8 (1972); G. HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY:
ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE 164-65, 183, 186-89 (1984).
14. The city of Sacramento's recent reintroduction of the poorhouse was held unlawful by
the California Supreme Court. Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 21
Cal. Rptr. 398 (1985).
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cating low-income housing projects in the poorest neighborhoods 15
and excluding them from the suburbs.16 We call some forms of gov-
ernmental assistance "insurance," and we use other forms of assis-
tance to control the deviance of, say, mothers who are not only
poor but unmarried.
Consider what happened to Ruth Jefferson, a black mother who
lived in Texas two decades ago. 7 Texas operated, with substantial
financial help from the federal government, two large-scale welfare
programs: old age assistance and aid to families with dependent
children (AFDC). The state set the same standard of need for all
its welfare programs, but the Texas Constitution put a ceiling on
aggregate spending for welfare."' To bring spending within this
limit, the legislature appropriated gross amounts for each welfare
category, and welfare officials ordered corresponding percentage re-
ductions of welfare benefits. In this scheme, the state funded aid to
the aged at 100% of need but set AFDC benefits at 50% of need.19
After Ruth Jefferson and others filed a lawsuit challenging this dis-
parity, the state increased the AFDC percentage to seventy-five
percent.20 One factor did distinguish the two large-scale programs:
sixty percent of the old age beneficiaries were white, but eighty-
seven percent of the AFDC beneficiaries were black or Hispanic.2 1
The Supreme Court, rejecting this "naked statistical argument, '1 2
saw no racial discrimination, and upheld the Texas scheme.-
Texas was not alone in its treatment of AFDC benefits. When
the program began, most beneficiaries were white widows. As black
and Latina women who were unmarried, separated, or divorced
15. Taylor & Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700,
1729 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
17. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
18. Id. at 537.
19. Id. at 556 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 548 n.17. Two very small programs were funded at 95% of need: aid to the blind
(56% black or Hispanic beneficiaries) and aid to the disabled (53% white beneficiaries). Id.
Welfare officials testified that they did not know the racial composition of the various bene-
ficiary groups when they issued their first order. Id. at 547 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney,
305 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (N.D. Tex. 1969)). It is hard to believe that Texas legislators appar-
ently were similarly ignorant.
22. 406 U.S. at 548.
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emerged as beneficiaries throughout the nation, the benefit levels
declined.2" The Texas legislature's decision to leave aid to the aged
intact while radically cutting AFDC benefits calls to mind an older
view linking poverty to cultural and moral pathology.24 In the
1960s Ruth Jefferson fell victim to a mentality with roots in mid-
nineteenth century London.
Welfare policy aside, some of the separation of the poor from the
rest of us results from a simple lack of means. It takes resources to
participate in activities that the community regards as validat-
ing25-- such as being an effective husband or wife or parent, or
holding a job, or engaging in some leisure pursuits that command
respect. These resources begin with income and assets, but they
may also include "social contacts or knowledge or political influ-
ence or prestige or health or personal attractiveness"2 -a list no-
table for its inclusion of things money can buy. The crucial ques-
tion is whether a family's resources meet the level that a particular
community "regards as the minimum necessary for decency. 27 To
fall below that minimum is to subject yourself to the community's
judgment that you are indecent, outside the community of persons
entitled to respect. The essential harm of this severe form of pov-
erty is stigma, a spoiled identity.
Compared to Western Europe, the United States provides low
levels of public assistance for poor people.28 One factor that weak-
ens the American public's support for social welfare programs is
the perception, widely shared among whites, that "welfare" means
23. D. PEARCE & H. McADoo, supra note 11, at 3-10. The real value of mean AFDC bene-
fits has continued to decline. Levitan documented a 36% decline from 1970 to 1983, supra
note 9, at 32. Cf. W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 94 (22% decline from 1972 to 1984). The
combined value of AFDC benefits and food stamps is below the poverty line in every state.
B. LEYSER, A. BLONG & J. RIGGS, BEYOND THE MYTHS: THE FAMILIES HELPED BY AFDC 3
(1985). Nationwide, about 43% of AFDC beneficiaries are black, and 14% are Latino. Id. at
38; see also Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 14-15 (1987).
24. G. HiMMELFARB, supra note 13, at 365-70.
25. See L. RAINWATER, WHAT MONEY BUYS: INEQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF IN-
coME, chs. 1 & 2 (1974).
26. Id. at 20.
27. J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 245 (3d ed. 1976); see L. RAINWATER, supra note
25, at 34.
28. M. KATz, supra note 7, at 271; see RESPONSES TO POVERTY: LESSONS FROM EUROPE 21,
22 (1984).
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aid to the members of racial and ethnic minorities. Although a
clear majority of public assistance beneficiaries are white, some as-
sistance programs do disproportionately serve minority benefi-
ciaries29 -giving negative racial attitudes a plausible target. Pov-
erty is dispiriting for anyone who experiences it involuntarily; yet,
here as elsewhere, there is something special about race. Black peo-
ple are not merely disadvantaged when they are poor; they are also
relatively poor because they are black."0 Racial discrimination
aside, structural unemployment normally does not transmit its ec-
onomic effects from one generation to the next. When talking
about economic conditions in black America, however, putting dis-
crimination aside is both obtuse and unjust."1
29. See supra note 23.
30. See generally 0. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 84, 125-32 (1977) (discussed the characteristics of blacks as a so-
cial group for purposes of equal protection analysis); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 557-58 (1977).
31. See Thurow, A Theory of Groups and Economic Redistribution, 9 PEI. & PUB. AFF.
25 (1979). The focus here on the poverty of black people is not meant to minimize the
severity of living conditions for large numbers of people in other minority communities. For
references on Indian tribal communities see V. DELoRm & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983); W. HAGAN, AMERICAN INDIANS (1961); E. SPICER, THE AMERICAN
INDIANS (1982); C. WEIKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987).
Outside the black ghetto, the greatest concentrations of minority poor are found among
Chicanos and other Latinos. The experience of Latinos in recent generations has followed
the historic pattern set by earlier immigrant groups: economic advance from one generation
to the next, accompanied by an increasing rate of intermarriage with non-Latinos. See
Thernstrom, Ethnic Groups in American History, in ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 3, 23-24
(L. Liebman ed. 1982). Since 1980, conditions have deteriorated in all poor communities,
including Latino ones. In 1985, 25.5% of "Hispanic" families' incomes fell below the federal
government's poverty line (as compared with 28.7% for black families and 9.1% for non-
"Hispanic" white families). On doubts among the "Chicano generation" about the likely
continuation of intergenerational advance, see R. Alvarez, The Psycho-Historical and Socio-
economic Development of the Chicano Community in the United States, in THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 33, 49-55 (1985).
"In 1981, 30 percent of Hispanic 18 and 19-year-olds were not high school graduates," and
some early-1980s predictions said the number of Latino children would double by the year
2000. H.R. REP. No. 748, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4036, 4040. On the high-school dropout problem, see Ortego, The Education of Mexi-
can Americans, in THE CHICANOS: MEXICAN AMERICAN VOICES 157, 165-69 (1971). In the
large urban barrios these problems may be closely associated with recent immigration. Lan-
guage barriers obstruct not only employment opportunities but a wide range of other inter-
actions, including dealings with governmental agencies designed to relieve the most severe
kinds of want.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
I. POVERTY AND THE CULTURE OF ISOLATION
In 1985, the median family income for whites in America was
$29,713; for blacks, $17,109.2' In the same year, the unemployment
rate for whites was 6.2%; for blacks, 15.1%.3 In 1985, 11.4% of the
white population lived below the federal government's officially de-
fined poverty line; for black people, the figure was 31.3%.34 For
children, the disparity was greater: 15.6% of white and 43.1% of
black children lived below the poverty level in 1985. (In 1984 the
latter figure was 46.2%.)35
Statistics like these remind us that yesterday's racial caste sys-
tem continues to affect today's world. Yet the gross figures conceal
marked differences within the black population. When the Su-
preme Court in 1982 pronounced the demise of "caste" legislation
in America 6 it spoke an important, but limited, truth. The formal
barriers are down; what was once called the "color line" is no
longer policed by the government. Since mid-century, blacks have
crossed the racial barrier in many labor unions and have found em-
ployment in significant numbers in clerical and service jobs, both
governmental and private. The same period has seen considerable
increases in the numbers of black officeholders, black professionals,
and black students in colleges and universities-in all, a flowering
of the black middle class.3 7 These changes are important, not only
In the long run, intergenerational advance seems a fair prediction. Yet each of us must
live in her own generation, and to be told that your grandchildren will have a better life is
only a partial comfort. In the meantime, poverty is taking its toll on a great many lives. A
friend of mine, a legal aid lawyer in Los Angeles, sees barrio residents every day who are in
desperate need, keenly aware of their obligation to their families, and filled with a sense of
failure for their inability to fulfill that responsibility.
32. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 427 (1988) (reported in 1986 dollars).
33. Id. at 381.
34. Id. at 434.
35. Id. at 435; see also Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Iden-
tity, 64 N.C.L. REv. 303, 341 n.241 (1986). Even when black and white family incomes are
equivalent, whites' accumulated wealth far exceeds that of blacks. Alexis, Black and White
Wealth: A Comparative Analysis, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE BLACK COMMUNITY: STRATEGIES
AND PERSPECTIVES 191 (1976).
36. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982).
37. See B. LANDRY, THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (1987); W. WILSON, supra note 10, at
109; Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 674-82 (1985); Taylor & Brown, supra note 15, at 1704-07.
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in providing role models for young blacks but also in providing an
important lesson for whites: that the capacities of black and white
people cover the same range. The same period has seen a moderate
but significant decrease in the differential between incomes of em-
ployed blacks and employed whites, for both men and women.38 As
always, opportunity is leading to acculturation. Naturally enough,
blacks employed in steady jobs tend to hold the same attitudes
toward the value of work as do employed whites, 39 and families of
any race with children in college tend to value higher education.
Rising incomes enhance the possibilities for family stability. Mod-
est increases in the number of black-white marriages40 attest to the
beginnings of a new stage of cultural assimilation. The uncompro-
mising rigidity that was the hallmark of the racial caste system is
gone. Yet roughly one-third of the nation's blacks are impover-
ished and living at the margins of society.41
A vivid early picture of life in the marginalized group is painted
in Tally's Corner, Elliot Liebow's masterpiece detailing the de-
structive effects of marginality on the black men who formed a
street-corner community in Washington, D.C., a generation ago.42
For the man who frequents Tally's Corner, the available jobs are
menial, or intermittent, or both. When a job is available, it is a
dead end, requiring no particular skills and leading to nothing bet-
ter. Wages are low, and sometimes deliberately set at low levels
with the expectation that employees will steal the rest of their
meager incomes, an expectation that tends to fulfill itself.43 These
men value marriage, both for its own sake and for the respect it
engenders, but for them the support of a family is next to impossi-
38. On the role of antidiscrimination legislation in this process, see J. JoNEs, LABOR OF
LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRE-
SENT 301-05 (1985). Unemployment rates are far more disparate. On black and white
women, see R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE. THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND RE-
PRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 152-54 (1984).
39. See generally J. GWALTNEY, DRYLONGSO: A SELF-PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA (1980).
40. See Karst, supra note 35, at 335 n.204.
41. Pettigrew, supra note 37, at 680; see also Lemann, The Origins of the Underclass (pt.
1), ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1986, at 31, 40 (estimated that between 200,000 and 420,000 of
Chicago's 1.2 million blacks comprise an underclass); Taylor & Brown, supra note 15, at
1707-09.
42. E. LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER. A STUDY OF NEGRO STREET CORNER MEN (1967).
43. See id. at 37-40.
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ble, and the search for respect as a provider soon turns to a search
for escape routes.44 The young men have seen it all before, in the
experience of their parents and the parents' serial companions. If
their activities emphasize present-time satisfactions, one good rea-
son is that the future offers little hope.45
Liebow organized his book around a series of roles occupied by
the street-corner man: "breadwinner, father, husband, lover and
friend. ' 46 Failure in the role of breadwinner reproduces itself as
failure in the other roles, with predictable harms to the man's
sense of personal worth. Tally Jackson wants "to be a person in his
own right, to be noticed by the world"; 47 in this respect he is like
his compatriots, who all "position themselves to catch the atten-
tion of their fellows in much the same way as plants bend or
stretch to catch the sunlight"4 8-but it all comes to naught, as it
always has.
Liebow's account of the histories of Tally Jackson and some
twenty other men bring to life the reality buried in statistics about
unemployment and income. The men's tragedy is that, for all their
assertion of alternative values, they have absorbed the larger soci-
ety's cultural messages about the values of work and family.49
Their sense of failure is thus deep, fundamental, and deadening to
the sense of self. Ironically, the cruelty is heightened now that the
formal system of racial caste is dismantled: the losers are regularly
told that they live in an era of equal opportunity. The fault lies,
they are now given to understand, not in their stars but in
themselves.
The process that undermines self-respect for the men on Tally's
Corner also affects the ghetto's women. Absent the expectation of a
steady income from employment, a stable marriage is extremely
unlikely.50 When marital breakup is the norm, women and men
44. See id. at 103-36.
45. See id. at 64-65.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. at 60.
48. Id. at 60-61. The same concern is central to the Chicago street corner men. See E.
ANDERSON, A PLACE ON THE CORNER (1976).
49. E. Lmsow, supra note 42, at 222.
50. In an important recent study of the 171 American cities with populations over
100,000, Robert Sampson confirmed that the strongest predictor of black family disruption
is the unemployment of black men. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male
[Vol. 30:1
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alike come to view the idea of a permanent union with suspicion.
For many women, this suspicion ripens into a generalization that
"you can't trust men."'1 Yet, although a young ghetto woman feels
little pressure to marry, having a baby is a different prospect. Her
motivation is not a welfare check: "Having babies for profit is a lie
that only men could make up, and only men could believe."52 Be-
coming pregnant is, however, one way of asserting control over an
important aspect of her life. Furthermore, having a baby indicates
entry into the responsibilities of adulthood-even when the mother
is a teenager and effective responsibility for her first baby is borne
by its grandmother. Despite this aid, the result of early parenthood
often is a drastic reduction in the young woman's education and
future employment prospects-typically with the result that she
has more children and becomes less likely to find employment at a
living wage.53
The overwhelming majority of ghetto children live in single-par-
ent households, and almost always the parent is a woman.5 4 If jobs
are available to those women, they tend to pay poorly, partly be-
cause they are "women's work." The better-paying jobs tend to be
part-time work that will not support a family. For middle-class
professionals, the two-income family provides material conditions
for the good life. Among black working people, the two-income
family is increasingly a necessity for survival without public assis-
Joblessness and Family Disruption, 93 AM. J. Soc. 348 (1987). See also W. WILSON, supra
note 10, ch. 3; Wilson & Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure: The Widening Gap
Between Evidence and Public Policy Issues, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT
DOESN'T 232, 232-59 (1986).
51. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 38, at 152; see J. LADNER, TOMORROW'S TOMORROW: THE
BLACK WOMAN 236-41 (1972); C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY ch. 7 (1974).
52. These are the words of Johnnie Tillman, a black mother of six who "had picked cot-
ton and worked in a laundry before she became too ill to hold a job." J. JONES, supra note
38, at 307. The average size of AFDC families is decreasing. Among families receiving AFDC
benefits in 1982, 74% had either one or two children; in 1969, only 50% of AFDC families
were this small. B. LEYSER, A. BLONG & J. RIGGS, supra note 23, at 11-12. The average num-
ber of persons in an AFDC family is 2.9, and "six of seven AFDC households have four or
fewer persons." S. LEVITAN, supra note 10, at 35. See also id. at 83.
53. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 38, at 150. By 1975 women who had first become mothers as
teenagers received more than half of all AFDC assistance. W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 29.
54. In some areas the proportion of these children is "close to 90%." Lamar, Today's
Native Sons, TIME, Dec. 1, 1986, at 26, 28.
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tance.5 5 Even if employed, the ghetto woman who is a single parent
typically will need welfare benefits.56 She will supplement that in-
come with contributions from household members whose attach-
ment to the household may not last, or who are employed only sea-
sonally or uncertainly. Despite the falsity of the charge that the
availability of welfare causes people to refuse work or quit their
jobs, 5 the cycle of welfare dependence, passed on from one genera-
tion to another, is no myth.
Raising a family in these circumstances is not only a challenge,
but a struggle. For an individual household, uncertainty of income
is the normal condition. Carol Stack has shown how the women
who head these families cope with this uncertainty by forming net-
works of domestic cooperation with the households of kin and of
friends. 58 The system of support includes men, both relatives and
steady companions, but it is the women of the ghetto who manage
the network. A woman who has the domestic network behind her,
or who controls the welfare money, and who is present from day to
day, has greater authority over her children than do the children's
fathers who live in other households. In this sense ghetto families
are "matrifocal."5 Yet, as Stack shows, to speak broadly of "disor-
ganization" when the network of kin and friends provides a stabil-
ity that a single household cannot provide on its own is a
mistake.6 0
The operation of the support network may not be a "job" in the
eyes of the larger society, but it is a never-ending responsibility,
constantly occupying the network's members in a life of urban
hunting and gathering.61 Women are regularly on the move, not
only changing residences frequently but moving about every day,
55. W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 77; Hacker, Where Have the Jobs Gone?, N.Y. REVIEW
OF BooKs, June 30, 1983, at 27, 28.
56. S. LEVrrAN, supra note 10, at 14, 38. About 75% of the income of all poor families
comes from wages and Social Security. Id. at 26.
57. See id. at 38-39; W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 17; S. DANZIGER & P. GOTTSCHALK,
LOSING GROUND: A CRITIQUE (IRP Special Report No. 38, Aug. 1985); Jencks, The Social
Basis of Unselfishness, in ON THE MAKING OF AMERICANS (1985).
58. C. STACK, supra note 51, ch. 6.
59. Id. at 22.
60. Id. at ch. 7. See also D. PEARCE & H. McADOO, supra note 11, at 12-14.
61. C. STACK, supra note 51, ch. 3. Typically, such a life is filled with anxiety, as high
levels of depression attest. D. PEARCE & H. McADOO, supra note 11, at 12.
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seeking help from kin, and dealing with the bureaucracies that dis-
pense welfare payments, food stamps, and Medicare. The exchange
of goods and services normally takes the form of gifts and loans
made on the basis of one person's present capacity to satisfy an-
other's pressing need. Only in the long run are the exchanges con-
sidered reciprocal. The network is, in effect, a small community
with a group identity.62 A woman finds much of her self-respect in
her ability to use the network to provide for her family's needs and
in her responsibility to the other members. She is, in short, creat-
ing a substitute for the values of equal citizenship. If her teenage
daughter sees motherhood as the first step on the path to
respected participation in the adult network, no one should be
surprised.
Any resources that come into the network are immediately ap-
plied to relieve someone's privation. This feature drastically
reduces the chances that any individual or couple will be able to
save or invest for their own future needs. Coming up with the first
and last months' rent for an apartment is hard enough; making a
down payment on a house seems fanciful. In fact, relatives may
deliberately seek to undermine a marriage that threatens to end
the husband's and wife's contributions to their respective net-
works. Stack tells the poignant story of Julia and Elliot, whose
union failed to survive Elliot's loss of his seasonal job, his subse-
quent demoralization, and the jealous intermeddling of Julia's kin
who resented the marriage as an interference with Julia's partici-
pation in their network. 4 No one can say whether Elliot and Julia
would have stayed together if his employment had been lasting. If
stable employment were available for ghetto residents generally,
however, no need for the survival networks that drain already un-
dernourished marriages would exist.
Liebow's study was made in the early 1960s,65 and Stack's ended
in 1971.6 Since those days, employment opportunities for ghetto
62. C. STACK, supra note 51, at 92-94.
63. Id. at 36-38, 105-07, 113-15.
64. Id. at ch. 7.
65. E. LIEBOW, supra note 42, at xv.
66. C. STACK, supra note 51, at 28.
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residents have taken a dramatic turn for the worse.6 7 Ghetto neigh-
borhoods today have extremely high unemployment and an in-
creasing number of people who have stopped looking for work.
Both men and women in the ghetto generally prefer jobs to wel-
fare, 8 but the closing of factories and other structural changes in
the economy have largely eliminated the kind of jobs that Euro-
pean immigrants formerly used as the first rung of the employment
ladder.6 New jobs are being created at the lowest levels, but they
do not pay a living wage; of the eight million net new jobs created
from 1979 to 1984, more than half paid less than $7000 a year (al-
most $4000 below the officially defined poverty level for a family of
four)." ° William Julius Wilson, a sociologist at the University of
Chicago, remarked: "It's as though racism, having put the black
underclass in its economic place, stepped aside to watch technolog-
ical change finish the job.'
Paradoxically, the worsening of the situation of impoverished
blacks is partly the result of improvements in the situation of
other black people. As antidiscrimination law has opened up op-
portunities in employment, education, and housing, these very op-
portunities have tended to fragment the black community-an
eventuality that can surprise no one who is familiar with the ef-
fects of economic advance on other cultural groups in America.
Many employed blacks living in two-parent families have moved
out of the poorest parts of the central city-an option that was
narrowly limited before the civil rights era. 2 The ghettos have lost
population since 1970. Consider what else the ghetto residents
have lost in this "second migration": personal connections into the
employment information network, marriage opportunities that
might lead to two-parent and two-income families, most of their
67. Lemann, supra note 41, at 31; Wilson, supra note 10, at 555 (1985); see also Lemann,
The Origins of the Underclass (pt. 2), ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1986, at 54 (discussion of
possible solutions to the problems of black urban ghettos).
68. See L. GOODWIN, DO THE POOR WANT TO WORK? A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
WORK ORIENTATIONS (1981).
69. W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 393-46; see M. HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POV-
ERTY 140 (1984).
70. Study Reports Rise in Low-Paying Jobs Over 5-Year Period, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1986, at B17, col. 1.
71. Lamar, supra note 54, at 27.
72. See Lemann, supra note 41.
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former community leaders, the stabilizing effects of the departed
families and of the businesses, churches, and other institutions
that served them. The ghetto has become the site of a new culture
of isolation, not just the isolation of blacks from whites, but the
isolation from middle-class blacks of the poorest and most depen-
dent blacks. In these circumstances the values of education, work,
and family stability are undermined. Why stay in school if your
friends have dropped out, the gang is demanding a lot of your
time, and schooling seems to offer little promise of a rewarding
job? Why spend your days searching for work when everyone you
know has stopped trying to find it? No wonder so many teenagers
seek to become somebody by getting pregnant, getting high, or get-
ting into trouble.73
To say that the concentration of the black poor in the ghetto
imposes strong pressures to depart from the values held by middle
class blacks and whites understates the case. Those pressures are
brought to bear most powerfully on young males, a number of
whom become involved in gangs and criminal activity. One view of
this response-a view I do not share-not only begins but ends in
the remark, "He never had a chance." Understanding may lead us
to forgive, but forgiving is not the same as excusing. These young
men are responsible for what they do; burglary and robbery are
serious crimes, deserving of condemnation and punishment. Yet
structural interpretations of juvenile crime in the ghetto also merit
consideration by the makers of public policy.
The point is not that unemployment or poverty directly causes
any particular young man to turn to crime. Rather, the unemploy-
ment of men in the ghetto translates into families headed by single
women, and the existence of such families in an area is the strong-
est predictor for serious crimes by black or white juveniles.7 4 No
73. Hacker, supra note 55; Lemann, supra note 41, at 38; see generally W. WmsoN, supra
note 10, at 202-62 (social problems of urban life disproportionately affect the marginalized
poor).
74. Sampson, supra note 50. The sociologists' and demographers' persistent references to
families "headed by women" seem to carry the insulting implication that two-parent fami-
lies are headed by men. Unfortunately, no alternative simple reference encompasses single
parents, women who live alone, and women who live with other women, grandchildren, etc.
Even "households without men" may mislead in some cases. For a discussion of poverty in
single-parent ghetto families headed by women, see W. WMSON, supra note 10, at 71-72.
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one can be sure of the precise mechanisms that produce these re-
sults, but we do know that areas with high proportions of.single-
parent families are also areas in which both formal and informal
social controls over young people are weakened. Those areas con-
sistently show low levels of community participation, not only in
politics but in the PTA, the YMCA, or the other voluntary organi-
zations that are so important in tying young people to the commu-
nity. Furthermore, reduced numbers of two-parent families mean a
weakening of adult guardianship over children, and a weakening of
defenses against the influence of the gangs. s
Behind structural abstractions like "black male unemployment"
stand the men on Tally's Corner and their younger brothers. Sup-
pose you are a teenage boy, living in a ghetto housing project.
Black male unemployment means not only that your father doesn't
live with you, but also that your own chances of finding a job at a
decent wage are slim. Unemployment drastically reduces your op-
portunities to validate your own identity through work and the
things wages will buy. What is left? One obvious way to be some-
one is to join the gang, to show what you are made of precisely by
defying the larger society and its values.
In his biting criticism of the 1834 reform of the English poor law,
William Cobbett saw the point in the perspective of political phi-
losophy.7 6 To throw the poor on their own resources is to remove
them from the community, to send them back to the Hobbesian
state of nature. In the war of all against all, why should they re-
spect others' property1 -or, we might add, others' persons? As vi-
olent crime increases in the ghetto, the vacuum left by the de-
parted community leadership is filled, in uncomfortably large
measure, by the gang leaders.1 8 Such a neighborhood is not a com-
munity, for a community needs a sense of generalized mutual obli-
gation and a sense of purpose. A battleground is not a community
of battle.
This cycle of dependency and despair is emphatically not the
norm for black Americans; most blacks see it as the pathological
75. Sampson, supra note 50, at 352-53.
76. W. COBBETT, COBBETT'S LEGACY TO LABouRERs, OR WHAT IS THE RIGHT WHICH THE
LORDS, BARONETS AND SQUIRES HAVE TO THE LANDS OF ENGLAND? (1835).
77. Id. at 104-05.
78. Lemann, supra note 41; Wilson, supra note 10.
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case.7 9 Yet poverty is a reality for almost one out of three of
America's black citizens, and the self-reinforcing cultural features
of isolation signal the danger that today's ghetto residents and
their offspring will be relegated to virtually permanent member-
ship in a marginalized group defined by race. 0 In describing these
developments some writers have pinned the label "underclass" on
a disparate collection of people ranging from mothers who receive
AFDC benefits to street criminals.8 ' This arresting label, like the
"culture of poverty" that has fueled a generation-long debate,82 fo-
cuses attention on the persistent divergence of behavior patterns
among the marginalized poor from middle-class norms-a virtually
undisputed matter. What has generated debate, and no little heat,
is the suggestion that some cultural deficiency prevents the
marginalized poor from taking advantage of opportunities.
Undoubtedly, patterns of behavior have staying power; surely
the culture of isolation has real consequences for the lives of indi-
viduals who live in it. Yet, if anything is axiomatic in human socie-
ties it is this: behavior ultimately responds to circumstances. The
danger in the "cultural deficiency" thesis is that it so easily trans-
lates into moralizing about individual failings, and thus into ratio-
nalizations for separating the marginalized poor from the rest of
society. The tendency to see the poor as the Other, to create
mental barriers excluding them from the population of equal citi-
zens, is hard to overcome in a society that prizes individualism.
When the marginalized poor are also members of racial or ethnic
minorities, the tendency toward distancing is heightened. The view
of paupers held by the Victorian Whigs is plainly visible in the
policies of our own national government toward social welfare pro-
grams in the 1980s.83
In raising the specter of a permanently marginalized class, I do
not assume that marginality is inexorably transmitted from one
generation to the next, or that the desperately poor are a group
79. See J. GwALTNEY, supra note 39; W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE:
BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 122-43 (1978); Wilson, supra note 10, at 545-
56.
80. W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 174-77.
81. K. AULETrA, THE UNDERCLASS 27-29 (1982); W. WILSON, supra note 10, passim.
82. Wilson & Aponte, supra note 10, at 236.
83. See M. KATZ, supra note 7, ch. 10.
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with "the character not so much of a class as of a 'tribe' or
'race.' "84 Rather, the recurrent patterns of behavior among
marginalized people seem predictable adaptations to the recurrent
patterns of their circumstances-a "survival culture." 5 Everyone
needs respect; and if the usual middle-class avenues to respect
seem closed, other avenues will be pursued."' In the demoralizing
circumstances of the culture of isolation, the sociologists' distinc-
tion between caste and class loses much of its utility.
II. RACE, MARGINALITY, AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
To be a citizen is to be a responsible participant in society.
America's pervasive individualism teaches most of us that the re-
sponsibility of citizens begins at home: part of our obligation to our
fellow citizens is to take care of ourselves and our families. In our
civic culture, egalitarianism usually takes an individualistic form,
centering on equality of opportunity. Equal citizenship is not a
charter for economic leveling either as a national ideal or as a prin-
ciple of constitutional law. Yet equal citizenship does call for the
community at large to take responsibility for assuring that all of us
have the resources necessary for inclusion. In the sphere of consti-
tutional law, that responsibility justifies some judicial intervention
to foster the inclusion of the marginalized poor-especially poor
women and poor members of racial and ethnic minorities-as
equal citizens. This intervention is justified irrespective of any par-
ticularized showing that some state "action" or legislative "classifi-
cation" has directly harmed particular individuals; the harm that
calls for remedy is exclusion from the community of equal citizens.
Such a view of state 7 responsibility is not new. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that other substantive claims of equal
citizenship impose on government certain non-delegable duties.
The state cannot constitutionally stand by and permit a "private"
body to exclude black voters from a pre-primary election that ef-
84. G. HIMMELFARB, supra note 13, at 367.
85. D. GLASGOW, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND ENTRAPMENT OF
GHETrO YOUTH 25 (1980).
86. See L. RAINWATER, supra note 25, at 38-40; Daly, Hunting the Wolf Packs, NEW
YORK, June 3, 1985, at 28.
87. In this discussion the word "state" refers broadly to government.
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fectively determines who will be elected to public offices in a local
community.8 Nor can the state stand by and let "private" owners
of a company town exclude a religious pamphleteer.8 " To move
closer to our own subject, the Supreme Court has hinted broadly
that a state, in operating its public schools, cannot constitutionally
charge a tuition fee that effectively excludes poor children. 0
Despite these rulings, recent majorities of the Supreme Court
have been unwilling to embrace any broad-scale theory of affirma-
tive state responsibility to afford citizens the necessities for effec-
tive citizenship. Even in the face of poverty that excludes people
from respected membership in the society, the prevailing equal
protection doctrine imposes no remedial obligation on government
absent a showing of state "action" that can be called invidious
discrimination.91
The impulses that have produced this restrictive view of equal
protection doctrine are understandable. Reflecting our tradition of
individualism, American law usually imposes remedial duties only
in response to particular wrongful acts that visibly cause harm.
Even one who is sympathetic to the claims of equal citizenship
may be uneasy about imposing affirmative duties on a state that
has not "caused" marginalizing poverty in some direct way. The
government in America, however, has not been simply an
uninvolved bystander allowing "market forces" to marginalize the
black poor.
In some cases government itself takes a direct hand in the rele-
vant market-a hand that often remains invisible to the Supreme
Court. In 1975, for example, a 5-4 majority of the Court held that
low-income members of racial and ethnic minorities lacked stand-
88. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
89. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). For other decisions recognizing a state's non-
delegable duty to prevent private racial discrimination, see Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past
Discrimination, 96 HARv. L. REv. 828, 848-53 (1983).
90. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 n.60 (1972); see also
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
91. See generally 0. FIss, supra note 30, at 106-13; Clune, The Supreme Court's Treat-
ment of Wealth Discriminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 SUP. CT. REV.
289 (argues that Supreme Court has outlawed racial discrimination but continues to allow
discriminatory practices); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049
(1978).
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ing to complain of the discriminatory effects of a zoning law that
effectively excluded low-income housing from Penfield, New York,
a white suburb of Rochester.92 In an opinion by Justice Powell, the
Court acknowledged that the town recently rejected applications
from two builders for rezoning that would allow them to build low-
and moderate-income housing. Yet, the Court said:
[T]he record is devoid of any indication that these projects, or
other like projects, would have satisfied petitioners' needs at
prices they could afford .... Indeed, petitioners' descriptions of
their individual financial situations and housing needs suggest
precisely the contrary-that their inability to reside in Penfield
is the consequence of the economics of the area housing market,
rather than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts."
Although the Court spoke of the "economics" of housing in
Penfield as it might speak of the town's altitude or mean tempera-
ture, Penfield itself played a significant part in structuring the
"supply" side of the local housing market by maintaining its exclu-
sionary zoning law. Another definition of the plaintiffs' injury
would be the denial of the chance-the equal opportunity-to
enter a housing market not skewed by unconstitutional official ac-
tion. Instead, the majority chose to do some excluding of its own.
Because the plaintiffs would not be heard to complain, the town
had no obligation to justify its zoning ordinance.9 4
Two years previously, the identical 5-4 majority chose to ignore
the manner in which a state structured the "demand" side of a
market, thus producing serious inequalities of educational oppor-
tunity.9 5 Like most other states, Texas had relied heavily on local
property taxes in funding its public schools.98 Because taxable
property was distributed unevenly, some school districts were
92. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
93. Id. at 506.
94. Two years later, in the similar case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court discerned an individual plaintiff
who bad standing. When the Court reached the merits of the case, however, the plaintiff
fared no better than his predecessors in Warth. The Court found no persuasive evidence
that the village used its zoning power to exclude blacks; thus the Court did not require
Arlington Heights or Penfield to justify its ordinance.
95. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. Id. at 7-9.
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wealthy and some poor. Public education is an amalgam of goods
and services that school districts must buy. A wealthy district
could levy property taxes at a low rate and still spend money on
schools at a high per-pupil level; a poor district had to levy much
higher taxes in order to spend far less money per pupil. 7 The
Court's majority upheld this scheme, remarking blandly that the
differences in school spending had resulted mainly from differences
in taxable property values among the districts."" The district lines,
of course, were not handed down from Heaven. Government offi-
cials drew the lines, and government officials maintained them,
knowing full well the result that would follow: in the market for
educational goods and services, some districts would have great
purchasing power, and others would have little.
The school-funding case illustrates a second point: in allocating
public goods, government need not limit itself to influencing mar-
ket choices. Government often decides whether a market will exist
at all. Shall the city charge for municipal water? Shall it collect a
fee when the fire department puts out a fire?99 More generally,
governmental choices about taxing and spending-the heart of the
modern legislative process-are the determinative factors in many
private markets. Every member of Congress knows that federal
spending-the construction of a highway or a dam, the purchase of
a weapon system, the location of a space center or a veterans' hos-
pital-will have major effects on local markets in employment,
housing and retailing. Government subsidizes medical care for poor
people with lung cancer while also subsidizing tobacco produc-
tion-and one can discern the effects on private markets, among
other places, in health care newsletters and lists of political cam-
paign contributors.100
97. See id. at 12-13.
98. Id. at 28.
99. For an especially illuminating discussion, see Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 7 (1969).
100. The hand of government intrudes especially heavily in the "market choices" of poor
women who face the question of childbirth or abortion. The Supreme Court has upheld both
state and federal laws that deny poor women funding for abortions-even medically neces-
sary abortions-while granting funds for childbirth expenses, which are more costly. Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). As Mark Tushnet
pointed out, given government's allocation of a great proportion of poor people's resources,
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Indeed, as the legal realists taught us long ago,10 1 the hand of
government is present in any market. The law, by protecting some
claims to property rights but not others, and by enforcing some
contracts but not others, determines whether a market will exist.
Since the New Deal era, the constitutional power of government to
make those determinations has gone virtually unchallenged. It is at
least half a century too late for anyone to say that law and govern-
ment merely provide a neutral playing field on which "market
forces" contend. Government in America has always influenced sig-
nificantly the distribution of goods, and politics typically has been
the province of the "haves."
Even if one rejects the inference that government bears a re-
sponsibility for relieving the most serious wants of poor people in
general,10 2 one may be persuaded that the factors of race and sex
make a difference. For example, a continuing consequence of racial
subordination in our country is housing segregation. Penfield's zon-
ing ordinance is only one example of the ways in which govern-
the denial of abortion funding may determine a poor woman's decision. Tushnet, The Su-
preme Court on Abortion: A Survey, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 161, 172-73 (3d
ed. 1986); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1353-55, 1658-59 (2d ed. 1988);
L. TRIBE, CONSTrrUUTONAL CHOICES 242-43 (1985). Confirming these expectations, Planned
Parenthood estimates that "approximately 20,000 poor women each year are unable to ob-
tain needed abortions and carry their unintended pregnancies to term." PLANNED
PARENTHOOD, MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ABORTION: THE "HYDE AMENDMENT" AND PUBLIC POL-
icy (n.d.). For a powerful contemporary criticism of Maher v. Roe, see Brudno, Wealth Dis-
crimination in the Supreme Court: Equal Protection for the Poor From Griffin to Maher, in
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 299 (R. Collins ed. 1980).
A number of states continue to fund abortions. In those states, only two percent of women
at medical risk from pregnancy continue their pregnancies to delivery. In states restricting
funding, 20% of at-risk women have carried their pregnancies to delivery. Cates, The First
Decade of Legal Abortion in the United States: Effects on Maternal Health, in ABORTION,
MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 307, 316 (3d ed. 1986). Even in states that deny abortion funding,
some poor women do manage to pay for abortions. "Plenty of rent checks have gone unpaid,
and plenty of food bills have been snipped in half, in order to pay for abortions-with disas-
trous results to poor women's health and that of their families." Campbell, Abortion: The
New Facts of Life, ESSENCE, Sept. 1981, at 86, 126.
101. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927); Hale, Force and the
State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149
(1935); Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries
Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627 (1946).
102. See, e.g., Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal
Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41. (I do not pretend that either Judge Winter or
Judge Bork would be so persuaded.)
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ment has intensified the residential isolation of the black poor. To
say that poor blacks are concentrated not by race but by poverty is
no answer; poor whites are not concentrated in anything like the
same degree. 10 3 The concentration of the black poor means that
the ghetto residents live in areas with high crime rates, and inter-
act mainly with others who are poorly educated and poorly con-
nected to the job market. It also means that the same conditions
tend to perpetuate themselves into succeeding generations. Not
only must children in the ghetto contend with the gangs; even
when they are in school, few of their classmates have any realistic
expectations of post-graduation employment at a living wage, and
fewer still are college bound. It would be miraculous if these cir-
cumstances did not generate feelings in the ghetto children that
"affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done, ' 1°1 corroding their motivation to learn and longer-term moti-
vations as well.
The concentration of the black poor is but one example of the
persistence of the effects of racial caste. These effects result from
myriad actions, past and present, public and private, that have
combined to produce the culture of isolation. Jim Crow was not
just a series of laws but a social system. Today's racial discrimina-
tion is more genteel, but it, too, is a system characterized by the
"resonance of society and politics."' 5 In considering whether gov-
103. In the 1985 population survey, about 60% of the black poor resided in central cities,
as compared with about 33% of the white poor. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, SERIES P-60, No. 158, table 6 (1987).
104. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). On the effects on schooling of the
concentration of the black poor in Detroit, see Sedler, The Profound Impact of Milliken v.
Bradley, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1693, 1703-09 (1987).
105. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1303 (1982). The fundamental flaw in the Supreme Court's current doctrinal ap-
proach, which whipsaws plaintiffs among the requirements of state "action," "causation" of
harm, and purposeful discrimination, is precisely that it neglects the ways in which myriad
public and private decisions interact with each other in circular reinforcement.
To say, as the Supreme Court often does, that one state agency cannot be held responsi-
ble for the actions of other agencies, or that government cannot be held responsible for
private choices, is to miss the essential point that the concentration of the black poor in the
ghetto-like Jim Crow-is a global system in which "everything is cause to everything else."
G. MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 78; see also Duncan, Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of
Race?, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 85 (D.
Moynihan ed. 1969); Karst, supra note 1, at 48-53. Such a determination of non-accounta-
bility represents, of course, a judicial choice.
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ernment bears a responsibility for the conditions of America's
marginalized poor, two questions are relevant. First, would the
word "ghetto" carry today's meaning if black people had come to
this country as other immigrant groups came, and if no laws en-
forcing slavery had existed, no Jim Crow laws, no systematic dis-
crimination by public institutions both South and North? Second,
would "the feminization of poverty" be part of today's vocabulary
if the law had not been used to confine women's expectations?
When we think about welfare mothers in the ghetto, of course, the
two questions come together.
The contributions of racial discrimination to marginalizing pov-
erty are an old and familiar story. What may be less familiar is the
way in which the marginality of one-third of our black population
completes the vicious circle, helping to perpetuate racial
discrimination.
III. RACE, GROUP STATUS, AND THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Social scientists, in studying minority group politics, sometimes
distinguish between status goals (centered on the principle of
treatment of the group's members as equals) and welfare goals
(such as improved schools or housing or health services).'0 6 Politi-
cal participation can be an instrument for attaining both types of
goals, but it is also valuable in itself, as a statement about belong-
ing. For six decades the enfranchisement of southern blacks was
one of the NAACP's most important objectives.10 7 One poignant
scene, recurrent during the civil rights era, was depicted in the
news photographs accompanying stories about blacks voting for
the first time in southern elections. Typically, the picture showed
newly registered black voters lining up to vote. It was unnecessary
Models for a different approach are readily at hand in the areas of school desegregation
and voting rights, in which the Court has placed on government agencies the burden of
showing that they are not responsible for present conditions of dramatic racial disparity,
conditions in which private decisions obviously play an important role. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Columbus Board of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); cf.
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state court cannot remove child from custody of a
white mother married to a black man on the basis of expected private animosity against the
child).
106. E.g., J. WILSON, NEGRO PoLrrcs: THE SEARCH FOR LEADERSHIP 185-213 (1960).
107. See, e.g., G. MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 820 (1940 program of NAACP).
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to read the accompanying article to understand what it meant to
those citizens to be included in the community's decision processes
after a lifetime of exclusion; a look at the people's faces told the
story. Formal equality by itself is not enough to make good on the
promise of equal citizenship, but it is an essential beginning.
The status of a minority group is not just a statistical interpreta-
tion; it is a matter of intense personal concern for every one of the
group's members. A black American wants the freedom to keep her
identity as a member of the group and also to belong as an ac-
cepted member of the larger society. She is aware that her own
individual standing in society is tied to the status of blacks gener-
ally. For her, the group's status goal of equal citizenship is not an
airy abstraction but a central aspect of her sense of self.
Thomas Reed Powell once remarked that if one could think of
something inextricably connected to something else, without think-
ing of the something else, then one had the legal mind.108 If any-
thing is clear from the history of race relations in America, it is
that the position of individual blacks in our society has always
been closely bound to the status of blacks as a group. Yet today's
constitutional doctrine often ignores the connection. This failure is
not merely the result of lawyers' and judges' ability to shield them-
selves from uncongenial experience; it is strongly entrenched in the
acculturation of white Americans. Our devotion to individualism
inclines us to assume that individual destinies are self-made, and
makes us reluctant to recognize harms suffered by people because
they are group members. More deeply, the tendency to identify
blackness with the Other affects our interpretation of the meaning
of racial disparities of wealth, status, and power, influencing us to-
ward attributing these disparities to some failing of black people
generally.
These two sets of attitudes look in opposite directions, simulta-
neously denying and affirming the relevance of group identifica-
tion, but they point toward the same denial of responsibility.
Neither individual whites nor the managers of governmental insti-
tutions are inclined to think they have any responsibility to rem-
edy the conditions of their black co-citizens-particularly those of
black people who are living in marginalized poverty. Our constitu-
108. See Teachout, Book Review, 34 UCLA L. REv. 537, 545 & n.17 (1986).
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tional doctrines reflect the same disinclination, founded on the
same attitudes. Before we turn to some of the doctrinal particulars,
let us take note of the ways in which fear intensifies those
attitudes.
The facts of life on Tally's Corner affect the status of black peo-
ple generally. Entry into the middle class does help blacks to find
acceptance in environments dominated by whites. Yet, that accept-
ance is incomplete. A quarter of a century after the Brown deci-
sion, Kenneth Clark lamented "the mocking reality that moving to
the suburbs and achieving middle-class status does not realistically
free any sensitive black in contemporary America from the psycho-
logical burdens of racism."109 The reasons for this unhappy fact are
multiple, but one important factor is the continued existence of a
large number of impoverished blacks living at the margins of soci-
ety-a situation that gives whites an up-to-the-minute excuse for
prejudice against blacks as a group.
The typical middle-class white male has been raised in a climate
dominated by an individualism that is nervous about connection
and empathy. Little in his own experience allows him to identify
with the frustration felt by black people generally, let alone the
despair that hangs over the ghettos. For him, the American civic
culture's ideology of opportunity is validated by the lives he knows
best: people "make it" individually, and they fail individually."0 If
substantial numbers of blacks do not succeed, the middle-class
white is apt to supply his own reason: blacks as a group must be
less talented or less ambitious or too attached to cultural norms
that he associates with his own negative identity. Racism, in other
words, has not "stepped aside.""' It continues to do the work of
any acculturated expectation: assigning meaning to behavior. The
109. Clark, Contemporary Sophisticated Racism, in THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF
RACE: A DIALOGUE AMONG BLACK AND WHITE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 105 (J. Washington ed.
1979); see also B. LANDRY, supra note 37, at 105-15 & chs. 4-6; Lawrence, A Dream: On
Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10 NOVA L.J. 627 (1986).
110. Even middle-class blacks often see the ghetto as "a collection of individual hard-luck
stories." Lemann, The Origins of the Underclass (pt. 2), ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1986, at
57.
111. Lamar, supra note 54, at 27 (quoting William Julius Wilson). See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
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meanings thus assigned affect attitudes toward public policy pro-
posals ranging from affirmative action to welfare reform.
The street crimes committed by ghetto youths are concentrated
heavily in the ghetto itself, but they are not confined there, and
their effects reach even the remote suburbs.112 When the everyday
reality of crime-including interracial violence---enters white
homes with the morning paper and the evening television news, it
touches deeply rooted fears. The fear of the alien, incomprehensi-
ble Other now has a footing in reality: the threat of physical as-
sault, or invasion of the home, or both.113 These fears are intensi-
fied in many a "white ethnic" neighborhood bordering the
ghetto-a neighborhood that has provided sanctuary for people
who themselves have been the historic victims of discrimination.
Here, the threat of violence combines with the fear that the ethnic
community will be dispersed as the ghetto expands, or as old resi-
dents leave to avoid the violence they foresee. In seeking to ex-
clude blacks from their neighborhood-even middle-class
blacks-these people see themselves as victims; in their own eyes
they are defending not just turf but their sense of cultural identity,
of connection." 4 From the white ethnic neighborhoods to the sub-
urbs, all these fears are heightened by white guilt-or, at least,
white awareness of the subordination of blacks and of the resent-
ment thus engendered. In the grip of anxiety, empathy comes
hard.
Sometimes whites do articulate their ancient fears of the re-
pressed black male; they may even subject those fears to examina-
tion. Often, however, the fears remain subconscious, affecting
white reactions to black people generally. If, as the figures on
chokehold deaths in Los Angeles suggest, the police tended to use
112. W. WILSON, supra note 10, at 22-26, 34-35; see Daly, supra note 86; Lemann, supra
note 41, at 33. For a discussion of "symbolic racism" among suburban whites, largely inde-
pendent of any objective threat, see Kinder & Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Ra-
cism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 414
(1981).
113. "Some 300,000 whites are on record as being robbed by blacks each year." Hacker,
Black Crime, White Racism, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, March 3, 1988, at 36.
114. See generally J. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF
THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985); J. RIEDER, CANARSWF THE JEws AND ITALIANS OF BROOK-
LYN AGAINST LIBERALISM (1985). Similar battles over turf are now being fought as increasing
numbers of Latinos move into the Los Angeles ghettos.
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chokeholds far more frequently against young black men than
against other people,'15 the pattern would not be surprising. A
chokehold was supposed to be used only when an officer perceived
a threat of serious harm. In the minds of white officers, race might
well have affected perception about the degree of danger." 6 And if
blacks who kill whites are considerably more likely to be sentenced
to death than are whites who kill blacks, 17 we need not ponder
long to understand what lurks in the shadows of the decision mak-
ers' minds. Even referring to "minds" may exaggerate the level of
consciousness; the reactions of police officers and prosecutors and
jurors in these cases are likely to be of the visceral kind." 8
At the heart of racial prejudice in America is fear. The fear is
not merely the dread of a violent response to generations of subor-
dination, but also includes the apprehension of displacement from
established positions. In a world of scarcity, competition is threat-
ening. When the fear of competition combines with the fear of the
Other, the result is a potent mixture. American history gives re-
peated and dramatic evidence that dominance itself-preventing
outsiders from belonging-frequently is a status goal." 9 When this
fear for the loss of personal status connects with the fear of vio-
lence-as it did with the terror of slave rebellions and the early
twentieth-century myth of the black beast rapistl2 -a white per-
son's sense of self can be threatened at its core.
The fear of a change in the system of racial dominance is not
just a collection of individual whites' fears of the competition of
individual blacks. It is an experience widely shared among whites
concerning blacks as a group. Acculturation happens to people, one
115. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 115-16 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (12 of
16 deaths from police chokeholds between 1975 and 1982 were of black males).
116. For a discussion of police acculturation and cultural difference in a California county
in the 1960s, see Swett, Cultural Bias in the American Legal System, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
79 (1969).
117. See McCloskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
118. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
119. See J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPER-
ANCE MOVEMENT (1963); H. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE: GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 44, 208-14 (1975); Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC.
Soc. REV. 3 (1958); Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 321
(1987).
120. See K. KARST, supra note 5, at ch. 5.
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by one, but acculturation is initiation into a community of mean-
ing, and in the case of racism, the meanings are projected onto an
entire racial group. 21 When Doughs Glasgow, Professor of Social
Work at Howard University, says, "The ghetto hurts all Blacks,
not just those entrapped in it,' 2 2 surely he has this projection in
mind. The middle-class white sees in the young black man deeply
mired in the cycle of violence and despair not an individual human
being living in the culture of isolation, but an abstraction. The pro-
jected face of the Other represents not a person but blackness it-
self; it serves as a receptacle for fears that have accumulated over
many generations of white acculturation. The status dimensions of
these fears extend to the potential competition of blacks with
whites at all levels of the economy and society.
Fear is the enemy of community; it corrodes the sense of respon-
sibility. In several striking parables, Harvard Law School Professor
Derrick Bell has brought into bold relief the ways in which white
fears of blacks are translated into constitutional doctrine, and the
consequences of that process for black people's perception of
themselves and their place in American society.123 Bell's parable of
"The Amber Cloud"'2 4 encapsulates in two pages the sadness and
frustration of millions of American blacks in the face of public pol-
icies and private behavior that ignore the needs of black people
when America takes care of "our own." The nation's experience
with other subordinated groups is richly diverse, but that experi-
ence does teach one clear lesson: if the "invisible man" is to be-
come visible as a person, as a full member of the American com-
munity, the vast majority of American blacks must enter the
middle class. 12 5 The moral for American law is plain: either we use
group remedies for past discrimination, or we give up the pretense
that a remedy is what we seek.
For all its importance, status equality cannot stand by itself.
Just as Jim Crow employed a mixture of formal legal disabilities
and informal social and economic sanctions, more than the elimi-
121. Blumer, supra note 119.
122. D. GLASGOW, supra note 85, at x.
123. Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARv. L. REv. 4 (1985).
124. Id. at 57-59.
125. Id. at 80.
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nation of formal legal inequalities is necessary to end the "status
harm" that is the main evil of a caste system. To speak of equal
citizenship as a status goal is, then, to identify an objective that
includes a measure of substantive equality along with formal
equality before the law. The best evidence of an end to black peo-
ple's legacy from the racial caste system would be for blacks and
whites to be ranged along the socio-economic scale in approxi-
mately the same distribution. On the other hand, a series of an-
tidiscrimination measures focused on welfare goals may work, in
the aggregate, important changes in the status of a previously
dominated group.12 6 Eventually, status and welfare goals converge.
In our national experience, cultural minorities secured full inclu-
sion in the community's public life only after the great preponder-
ance of their members visibly advanced into the middle class.
In this process politics certainly can help; the successes achieved
under the civil rights laws of the 1960s provide thousands of cases
in point. Yet, poor people constitute a distinct minority of our
population, and, in a political world increasingly dominated by ex-
tensive campaign spending, their influence cannot even match
their numbers. In today's America, majority rule means govern-
ment of, by, and for the comfortable. 2 7 When the marginalized
poor go to court seeking inclusion in the community of equal citi-
zens, they are apt to be told that they are just another interest
group whose claims are properly part of "the routine grist of the
political mill."' 2 The metaphor of grinding captures nicely the po-
litical condition of the marginalized poor in the legislature, where
their claims have so often been ground into powder, then blown
away on winds of oratory about individual initiative.
126. The public accommodations and employment discrimination titles of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 are instructive examples.
Welfare affects status in an immediate way. Voter registration in many states entails
proof of a domicile in the election district. See Note, Disenfranchisement of Homeless Per-
sons, 31 WASH. U.J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 225 (1987).
127. The poor do not even vote in proportion to their numbers. See generally E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA ch. 6 (1960). The typical American voter is "relatively well-off, well-educated, and
middle-aged," that is, one likely to identify with the prevailing distribution of income and
power. K. SHIENBAUM, BEYOND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF
VOTING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 89 (1984).
128. Winter, supra note 102, at 100.
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IV. A ROLE FOR JUDGES
It is easy to see how most elected decision makers can ignore the
marginalized status of the poor, or treat such status as a just pun-
ishment for deviance from majoritarian norms. A further complica-
tion arises from the time scale of many anti-poverty efforts. It is
hard for any elected official to look beyond the horizon of the next
election, which for many legislators is always less than two years
away. For example, a job training program may be cost-efficient,
but its present costs are high and the savings it will produce (in
public assistance costs, in costs of other public services, and in
costs of crime and punishment) will emerge only in the longer
term.1 29 The judiciary is, however, "the one governmental element
that is disposed by its nature to take the long-run into account." 1 0
Furthermore, our courts have their own independent responsibility
to the principle of equal citizenship.
In the Warren era, the Supreme Court edged toward a doctrinal
recognition that poor people deserved special judicial concern. A
"neutral" law might have the effect of excluding the poor from
some important government service. For instance, the right to ap-
peal from a criminal conviction was conditioned on furnishing a
transcript of the trial, and a transcript would be provided only for
a fee. In that very case, the Warren Court held that the state must
supply a free transcript to a would-be appellant who could not af-
ford to buy one.131 In other contexts, too, the Court required gov-
ernment to make up for a lack of resources to mount an effective
defense to criminal prosecution. 32
129. S. DANZIGER, ANTIPOVERTY POLICY AND WELFARE REFORM 4 (1988) (paper prepared for
Rockefeller Foundation Conference on Welfare Reform, Williamsburg, Va., Feb. 1988); see
also Bassi & Ashenfelter, The Effect of Direct Job Creation and Training Programs on
Low-Skilled Workers, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 133 (1986).
130. R. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 229 (1960).
131. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
132. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police warnings of right to remain
silent and to consult counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to trial
counsel); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appellate counsel). Even when
the Court validated a measure of police discretion to "stop and frisk" citizens on the street,
it expressed concern about possible police harassment of members of minority groups, par-
ticularly blacks. The Court said that such conduct should result in the exclusion of evidence
thus obtained. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 & n.11, 15 (1968). Similarly, the Warren Court
recognized that vagrancy laws were used as a basis for stopping blacks for questioning when
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Surely, the Justices knew that poor people in the criminal pro-
cess included disproportionate numbers of defendants from racial
and ethnic minorities. 133 Similarly, when the Court ruled that a
state could not condition an indigent person's right to vote on the
payment of a poll tax,134 the Justices knew the historic use of those
taxes in denying the vote to blacks. And the Justices could not
have been ignorant of the disproportionate representation of mi-
norities in the ranks of welfare beneficiaries when the Court held
that a state could not limit welfare benefits to people with a year's
residence in the state.3 5 These decisions, taken together, reflected
not only solicitude for the poor but an awareness that serious con-
cern for racial equality implied a concern for the ways in which
status and welfare goals were intertwined.
Yet, these opinions never explicitly mentioned race. Indeed, the
Court suggested only occasionally that it was protecting the poor.
Its opinions emphasized instead the importance of the particular
items the state must supply. As a result, a later majority easily
characterized those precedents restrictively, not as decisions about
race or poverty, but as decisions about such things as the right to
vote or the right to counsel. 36 Of course, the Burger Court's major-
ity looked for ways to contain the expansion of the earlier prece-
they were in predominantly white neighborhoods at night. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972) (invalidating on vagueness grounds a vagrancy law that was a direct
descendant of England's poor law).
133. Long before the Warren era, when the Court first recognized constitutional limita-
tions on the states' criminal justice systems, the Justices had a similar awareness of the
importance of their rulings in the South, where the black population was concentrated and
where black defendants faced formidable obstacles in the criminal process. See Cover, supra
note 105, at 1305-06.
134. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
135. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court's protections against discrimi-
nation based on the status of "illegitimacy" also surely proceeded in full knowledge of the
historic use of such laws in southern states to prevent wealth transmissions from white fa-
thers to the children of black women. The first two cases came from Louisiana: Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
The Burger Court, perhaps recognizing today's significant correlation between race and "il-
legitimacy" throughout the country, held that a state could not constitutionally deny wel-
fare benefits to families with illegitimate children. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973).
136. Commentators who saw the equal protection clause as largely devoid of substantive
content (apart from racial equality) joined in this characterization. E.g., Lupu, Untangling
the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 981, 1054-70 (1979).
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dents. In 1970, the Court turned away from any generalized consti-
tutional obligation to relieve poor people from the marginalizing
consequences of their poverty; the turning point was Dandridge v.
Williams.13 7
Linda Williams lived in Baltimore with her eight children, who
ranged in age from four to sixteen. She and one of the children
were in poor health. 38 The children's father was absent and con-
tributing nothing to the household; the family's total lack of finan-
cial resources had befallen after the youngest child was born. Wil-
liams was receiving benefits under Maryland's AFDC program.
The state established a schedule of financial need for AFDC fami-
lies, with decreasing amounts for each person after the initial bene-
ficiary, but with a fixed additional amount for each person over ten
persons; for the Williams family, the standard of need was $296.15
per month. 3 9 The state also limited, however, the amount that any
one family could receive; in Baltimore this maximum was $250 per
month.4 ° Undoubtedly this limit did not represent a calculation of
economies of scale, and had nothing to do with need; it simply re-
sulted from the legislature's failure to appropriate enough money
to satisfy the needs the state had defined.'"
Linda Williams, along with Junius and Jeannete Gary, a couple
in similar circumstances, 42 challenged the maximum grant limita-
tion as a violation of the equal protection clause. A three-judge
federal district court agreed with their claim. 43 A 6-3 majority of
the Supreme Court, however, concluded otherwise: Maryland's dis-
crimination-between the benefits per child for the Williams and
Gary children and the benefits per child for Baltimore children
who lived in smaller families-fell within "the area of economics
137. 397 U.S. 471 (1970); see also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). William Clune, supra note 91, criticizes
trenchantly the Burger Court's withdrawal from the protection of constitutional rights in
this area.
138. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 297 F. Supp.
450 (D. Md. 1969).
139. 397 U.S. at 490.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 487.
142. The Garys had eight children; the father was disabled and the mother in ill health.
Their level of need was set at $331.50 per month. 297 F. Supp. at 453.
143. Id. at 469.
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and social welfare," and thus must be upheld if it had any reasona-
ble basis.144 The Court's opinion acknowledged that the case in-
volved not the usual run of business regulation but "the most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings."'1 45 Still, said the
majority, it was reasonable for the state to give AFDC recipients
generally an incentive to seek employment.14
It is worth pausing here to reflect on the ways in which comfort-
able people, including legislators and judges, are inclined to project
their own negative identities on the abstract image of "the poor,"
regarding all of them as people who just haven't been industrious.
Linda Williams and the Garys were not employable. 47 Their plight
remained hidden behind the mask of the Other. The Supreme
Court recognized that the real people in the case were not able to
work, but dismissed that knowledge with a shrug. The equal pro-
tection clause, said the Court, did not require the legislature to
"choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attack-
ing the problem at all.''4 8
One rationalization for this change in judicial course was ready
at hand in the dissents of the second Justice Harlan from the ear-
lier poverty decisions of the Warren Court. Harlan, echoing Jeremy
Bentham's century-old critique of egalitarian reform, 49 had raised
the stopping-place problem: the difficulty of defining limits on the
potentially infinite reach of the equal protection clause. Making
Harlan's lament their theme song, the Court's more recent majori-
ties have assumed apparently that a judicial response to the effects
of poverty, unlike a legislative response, is limited to the choice
between attacking poverty wholesale or ignoring the problem alto-
gether. The majority Justices seem to see only two options: either
complete judicial passivity or a broad-scale judicial commitment to
economic leveling. If this mistaken assumption were the only prob-
lem, it would be easily solved. More fundamental difficulties, how-
144. 397 U.S. at 485.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 486.
147. See supra notes 138 & 142 and accompanying text.
148. Id. at 486-87. The Court's extreme deference to legislative judgment in this area
continues unabated. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987).
149. J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 119-23 (C. Ogden ed. 1931).
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ever, complicate any effort to apply present equal protection doc-
trine to the needs of the marginalized poor.
From law school casebooks to Supreme Court opinions, the pre-
vailing view is that issues of constitutional equality begin as
problems in classification. This view, articulated in an influential
article of the 1940s"5 focuses on a legislature's different treatment
of people or transactions, and asks whether those classifications, or
discriminations, are sufficiently justified. By the end of the Warren
era, the Supreme Court and its commentators had developed two
kinds of cases in which the state carried a heavy burden of justifi-
cation: "suspect" classifications-racial discrimination being the
archetype-and "fundamental" interests. 5' The Court still says
that a classification of either of these types violates the equal pro-
tection clause unless the state can show that the classification is
necessary to achieve a governmental interest of "compelling" im-
portance. Other legislative classifications are upheld on lesser, and
varying, showings of governmental need. Consequently, huge quan-
tities of high-powered legal energy are expended in persuading
courts to use higher or lower "levels of scrutiny," that is, to de-
mand greater or lesser degrees of justification in support of legisla-
tive classifications. This whole tedious process of argumentation
and opinion-writing is an exercise in rationalization. It began as a
way of avoiding the charge of judicial legislation by giving a judi-
cial appearance-categories, rules and all-to the courts' interven-
tions to correct particularly serious abuses of legislative power. 5
The exercise continues because it provides lawyers and judges on
all sides of equality issues with rhetorical paint to decorate the re-
sults they advocate.
150. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949).
151. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 16 (2d ed. 1988); Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1103-04 (1969); Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Karst, Invidious Discrimi-
nation: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16
UCLA L. REv. 716, 718-20, 732-46 (1969).
152. See Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7 (1979).
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The trouble is that no sensible analysis of marginalizing poverty
will fit into this scheme. 153 Where is the legislative classification
that puts Tally Jackson in his place on the corner? The question
touches more than legal doctrine: it reaches poor people at the
center of self-identification. Finding no one in particular to share
responsibility for his condition of marginality, Tally Jackson
blames himself.
One reason this self-critical evaluation carries so much force is
that the life experience of a single individual cannot contradict it.
Demonstrating that any one person's economic condition is the re-
sult of racial discrimination is impossible. The difficulty lies in the
importance of indeterminate factors-what most of us call
luck-in the success or nonsuccess of particular individuals. To
paraphrase Lester Thurow: because everyone is subject to a variety
of good and bad random shocks, no one can tell whether any indi-
vidual has been unfairly treated by looking at that person's in-
come. Judgments about systematic discrimination "can only be
made at the level of the group."154 Considered in isolation, Tally
Jackson has no supportable complaint against anyone; he is just
down and out. Yet, if we aggregate the lives of Tally and Sea Cat
and Richard and Leroy' 5 5-and their myriad counterparts on other
corners in America's other inner cities-their common situation
can be seen as membership in a marginalized group that has the
look of permanence and is associated with race. That the race in
question is the same one that previously defined a subordinate
caste is no accident.
Thurow draws a natural conclusion from his analysis of the mea-
surement of racial discrimination: "[T]he inability to identify any-
thing except group discrimination creates an inability to focus
remedies on anything other than the group."' 56 Thurow uses the
153. Catherine Hancock helped me see the importance of this incongruity for my own
analysis. Frank Michelman argued in 1969 for abandonment of the traditional analysis of
legislative "classifications" in dealing with the claims of the poor under the fourteenth
amendment. Michelman, supra note 99; see also Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A
Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39.
154. Thurow, supra note 31, at 27-29.
155. These are the fictitious names that Elliot Liebow gave to some of the men who
formed Tally Jackson's street-corner society. E. LIEBOW, supra note 42, at 23-27.
156. Thurow, supra note 31, at 29.
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term "remedies" broadly, to encompass legislative remedies. To a
lawyer, however, the reference to remedies calls to mind the court
orders that culminate lawsuits: the award of damages to a victim of
discrimination, or an injunction to end discrimination or its effects.
Although the cumulative consequences of generations of group
subordination are dramatically visible on Tally's Corner, the Su-
preme Court's present view of the law makes it hard to translate
those conditions into a successful lawsuit. Under the Court's pre-
sent doctrine, judicial remedies are available only to individual
plaintiffs who can demonstrate that particular harms were caused
by particular acts of misconduct by particular government officials
who intended the harms. 157 Tally Jackson is out of court.
To appreciate the constitutional standing of the marginalized
poor we need a fresh start-not a new edifice of doctrine, but a
perspective that lets one see the faces of real people behind the
abstraction, poverty. That abstraction seems immense and impene-
trable, and one can see easily how it gives judges pause. How can a
court be expected to end poverty? A market-in fact, any activ-
ity-inevitably means that some people will succeed more than
others. 158 A judge cannot issue an injunction that runs against the
whole economy-and even if the judge could, what would the order
command? Putting the matter this way, as the present Supreme
Court majority evidently does, guarantees the conclusion that a
court can do nothing.
Imagine, however, that you are in Tally Jackson's shoes. What
hurts the most? Not that you have a low income, or even that your
furniture and clothes are shabby. What really hurts is that you are
denied the self-respect that comes from supporting a family, from
being a producing member of the society. You are excluded from
the community of respectable people, denied any citizenship that
is more than formal. The worst harm of marginalizing poverty is
not being poor but being marginalized. 59
157. See 0. Fiss, supra note 30, at 113-18; Clune, supra note 91; Freeman, supra note 91.
158. See, e.g., R. ARON, PROGRESS AND DISILLUSION: THE DIALEcTICS OF MODERN SOCIErY
33 (1968).
159. Frank Michelman suggested that one should view the constitutional injury wrought
by severe poverty as one of "deprivation" rather than "discrimination." Michelman, supra
note 99, at 13. The analysis offered here blurs the line between those two categories, for the
crucial deprivation is exclusion from equal citizenship.
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In the near future, no doubt, the Supreme Court will continue to
give politics a free hand in "the area of economics and social wel-
fare,"' 0 even when "the most basic economic needs of impover-
ished human beings '161 are at stake. Yet the one certainty about
our constitutional law is its capacity to develop when the need is
great. The principle of equal citizenship may yet come to play a
more important role in the lives of poor people in America, and it
is worthwhile to see what that role might be.
The idea of equal citizenship focuses on those inequalities that
are particularly likely to stigmatize, to demoralize, to impair effec-
tive participation in society-or, to put the matter more positively,
on "the needs that must be met if we are to stand to one another
as fellow citizens."16 2 Undoubtedly, some material wants impose a
stigma that denies the essential humanity of those who are stigma-
tized. These stigmatizing inequalities are defined culturally: "The
fact that an American slum dweller eats better, dresses better, or
has more gadgets than a rich Eskimo, a nineteenth-century farmer,
or a medieval squire does not console him if he lacks the where-
withal for what his own society regards as a fully human exis-
tence."' 63 Other inequalities, though, do not have the same poten-
tial for demoralizing through stigma. There is a difference, in other
words, between being poorer than someone else and being part of
"the disreputable poor. 16 4
160. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); see supra note 144 and accompany-
ing text.
161. 397 U.S. at 485; see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
162. Walzer, Justice Here and Now, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND Now 136, 143 (F.
Lucash ed. 1986).
163. R. Rodes, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 149 (1976).
164. See Matza, The Disreputable Poor, in SocIAL STRUCTURE AND MOBILITY IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 310 (1966).
No stigma attaches to one who must work for a living rather than clip coupons, live in an
apartment rather than a house, or use a public beach rather than a private one. Yet some
kinds of work or living quarters are stigmatizing, as Matza makes clear. Id. at 314-15. Gov-
ernment's responsibility under the equal citizenship principle is not an absolute duty to
eliminate all such conditions, irrespective of cost. Rather, it is a duty to take reasonable
steps to include marginalized people in the community of equal citizens or to offer substan-
tial justification for failing to do so. See also Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Wel-
fare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 983-91 (1973)
(examining Rawls' theory of welfare rights, focusing on right of self-respect); Plamenatz,
Diversity of Rights and Kinds of Equality, in EQUALITY: NoMos IX 79, 91-92 (1967) (con-
trasted the equal right to a decent living with the equal right to dignity).
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In American society, money does not merely buy goods; it buys
status. "Unless we own a certain number of socially required
things, we cannot be socially recognized and effective persons."1 5
Yet not all economic inequalities are presumptively violations of
the principle of equal citizenship. One of the primary citizenship
values is responsibility; indeed, to be held responsible is an essen-
tial part of being treated as a person.166 The Civil Rights Act of
1866 did more than guarantee rights to the newly freed slaves. The
Act went on to provide that its beneficiaries could "be parties" to
lawsuits-defendants as well as plaintiffs-and "be subject to like
punishment, pains and penalties" as were imposed on whites.67 To
be a citizen is to be a member of a moral community, to be a re-
sponsible person, not a ward of society.
Given our individualist expectations that people will provide for
themselves and their families, welfare dependence tends to erode
self-respect-which is part of the reason that most welfare recipi-
ents would prefer to work. To be responsible in this way-and, in
so doing, to contribute to the society's total product-is part of
what it means to be a "good citizen" in our prevailing ideology,
part of the process of maintaining a healthy self-regard. The equal
citizenship principle is not an invitation for judges to declare capi-
talism unconstitutional. What it asks of our courts is a serious ju-
dicial inquiry when inequalities undermine the foundations for as-
suming the responsibilities of citizenship, and the political
branches of government turn a blind eye. The more a particular
inequality stigmatizes its victims, or prevents them from partici-
pating as full members of the society, the more justification should
be demanded.
Judges will be able to identify the types of degrading poverty
and to detect official neglect if they look beyond the abstract idea
of poverty to the meaning of being poor in the lives of particular
people and in the social histories of particular groups. For exam-
ple, Ruth Jefferson and Linda Williams168 are black women. When
165. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 143 (1983);
see also L. RAINWATER, supra note 25.
166. See Karst, supra note 1, at 9-11.
167. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
1982 (1982)).
168. See supra notes 17-22 & 137-48 and accompanying text.
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white male legislators project their own negative identities on the
abstraction, poverty, they readily equate it with black or Latina
welfare mothers. 69 In fact, marginalizing poverty may go unre-
lieved precisely because of this association-as surely happened
when the Texas legislature drastically cut Ruth Jefferson's AFDC
benefits. Yet that same case shows how the abstraction, poverty,
can also shield judges from looking claimants in the face.
To look at the human context of marginalizing poverty in
America is to recognize that it normally attaches to people who are
already, in the perspective of legislative decision makers, members
of "outsider" groups. Their marginality comes not from poverty
alone, but from the combination of being poor with being a wo-
man, a black, a Latino, or handicapped in mind or body. In con-
texts like these, only modest adjustments in constitutional doctrine
are needed for the courts to do a better job in recognizing the or-
ganized community's responsibility to remedy the lingering effects
of the racial caste system. Elsewhere I have addressed some of
those doctrinal implications of the principle of equal citizenship; 170
here I do no more than mention three of them.
First, the state "action" limitation, engrafted on the fourteenth
amendment by the late-nineteenth century Supreme Court, should
be understood in the broad perspective of state responsibility out-
lined earlier."' Second, Courts should not restrict the reach of the
equal protection clause to purposeful discrimination. Instead, when
government behavior produces effects that disproportionately
harm women or racial or ethnic minorities, courts should under-
stand the clause to demand substantial justification. 72 Third, the
courts should understand also that programs of affirmative action
are not just evils to be tolerated, but tools that are needed if our
society is to achieve the broad remedial purposes of the fourteenth
169. For one clear-cut example of legislative equation of "low-income" persons with
blacks, see Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982). On the "striking
correlation" between restrictions on AFDC benefit increases in Alabama and increasing per-
centages of black beneficiaries, see Whitfield v. Oliver, 399 F. Supp. 348, 352 (M.D. Ala.
1975).
170. See infra notes 171-73.
171. See also K. KARST, supra note 5, at ch. 5.
172. See K. KARST, supra note 5, at ch. 9; Karst, supra note 1, at 48-53; Karst, The Costs
of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1163 (1978).
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amendment-that is, to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination. 17
3
Ultimately, however, the equal citizenship principle is less con-
cerned with correcting official wrongdoing than it is with including
all Americans in the community of equal citizens. In effectuating
this principle in the context of poverty, a judge looks not only at
indications of legislative hostility or indifference to the Other but
also at another aspect of a case. What, exactly, is lost when a poor
person cannot afford to pay for the particular good that is at stake
in the case? Some material inequalities do and some do not seri-
ously interfere with the inclusion of poor people as respected mem-
bers of the society.
In 1982, five Justices showed their willingness to inquire into
both kinds of contextual factors in Plyler v. Doe.' 4 The Texas leg-
islature withdrew state funding for the education of alien children
whose parents were undocumented, and authorized local school
districts to turn those children away or to condition their educa-
tion on the payment of tuition fees. 175 Here, of course, explicit leg-
islative discrimination existed against an identified class of people
A 5-4 Court held that the law denied the excluded children the
equal protection of the laws.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court treated the doctrine
concerning the "levels of scrutiny" question cavalierly, but the
faulting of his behavior is left to those who believe that body of
doctrine is worth preserving. On the matter of the factors influenc-
ing the decision, the majority was forthright. To deprive the alien
children of free public education was to condemn them to long-
term exclusion from effective participation in our society, and the
legislature's hostility to their parents-outsiders in so many
ways-was evident. Maybe education wasn't quite a "fundamen-
173. K. KARST, supra note 5, at ch. 9; Karst, supra note 35, at 341-46; Karst & Horowitz,
Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974); Karst & Horowitz,
supra note 152.
174. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Plyler produced some sophisticated doctrinal commentary. See,
e.g., Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup.
CT. REv. 167; Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants in American Law, 44 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 163, 329-432 (1983) (symposium with analyses by Michael Perry, Judith Lichtenberg,
Tom Gerety, Gerald Rosberg & Elizabeth Hull).
175. 457 U.S. 202, 205 n.1.
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tal" interest, and maybe a classification that disadvantaged the
children of undocumented aliens wasn't quite "suspect," but the
effect of this burst of nativism, as the Court said, would be the
creation of a new subordinate caste. 1 6 Perhaps there is irony in
the Court's vindication of the principle of equal citizenship in a
case involving aliens. 1 7 If so, it is matched by the irony of an ear-
lier Court's stirring affirmation that racial classifications were "sus-
pect" in an opinion upholding the wartime "relocation" of Japa-
nese-Americans, aliens and citizens alike, behind barbed wire.""
The Court did not decide Plyler v. Doe as a poverty case, for the
children's lawyers were far too sophisticated to argue the case in
those terms. Nonetheless, the decision illustrates how a judge
should seek understanding of the constitutional import of a partic-
ular form of poverty. The most important questions to ask are
questions about belonging: Does this form of poverty marginalize
its victims, excluding them from effective participation as equal
citizens? Is there reason to believe that the government would
have filled the need if the decision makers had regarded the claim-
ant not as part of an outsider group but as a full member of the
society? Once the court answers those questions, it can turn to the
justifications offered for government's failure to fill the need. Un-
dertaking inquiries like this using the vocabulary of "fundamental"
interests and "suspect" classifications is possible. In the recent
past, however, those categories have had the effect of obstructing
judges' perceptions of real people's real needs. When judges see
their options in all-or-nothing terms, they tend to opt for
nothing.179
176. Id. at 230.
177. See Karst, supra note 1, at 44-46; Developments in the Law, supra note 151, at
1110-15, 1163-65.
178. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
179. Justice Marshall saw this point clearly in his dissent in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). On the "mud-
dled" responses of the Burger Court to problems of the poor, see Bennett, The Burger Court
and the Poor, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed.
1983).
Discussions of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), sometimes treat the choices
before the Court as a problem in shuffling funds among the poor; the assumption is, of
course, that a court cannot order a net increase in welfare spending. Plyler points in another
direction. The decision required Texas to increase considerably its spending on educa-
tion-in amounts exceeding what it would have cost Maryland to fund large welfare families
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In its remedial aspect, the Plyler case was easy: all the courts
had to do was to forbid state officials to carry out the Texas legis-
lature's discrimination against an identified group. The harms of
marginalizing poverty in the ghetto are not so neatly packaged for
judicial handling. It would be quite wrong to conclude, however,
that the courts have no role to play in vindicating the constitu-
tional claims of the marginalized poor.
The beginning point would be the recognition by the Supreme
Court, in an appropriate case,1 0 that the ghetto's chronic unem-
ployment and welfare dependence are intertwined parts of a social
system that marginalizes its victims, denying them equal citizen-
ship. I do not claim that courts can abolish poverty by judicial de-
cree, and I am not nominating King Canute for the Supreme
Court. Beyond any judicial declaration will lie the crucial questions
of remedy. Just as the remedies for segregated schools originated
with desegregation plans filed by school boards, remedies that ad-
dress the harms of ghetto unemployment and welfare dependency
should find their initial definition in the proposals of elected offi-
cials. Any such remedies will be partial. For example, the benefits
of job training will take time to mature, and large numbers of the
ghetto poor will likely remain beyond the effective reach of any
judicial remedy. Again, the analogy to school desegregation is apt.
So, no one should expect miracles from the judges who seek to
protect equal citizenship against the worst ravages of material
want. Modest beginnings hold the most promise. In arguing for a
constitutional right of livelihood, Charles Black has sensibly sug-
at the level the state had defined for those families' needs. Considerations of cost and state
resources are highly relevant in determining state responsibility under the equal citizenship
principle, but existing public budgets are not immune from judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Grif-
fin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (ordering the reopening-and thus funding-
of a county's public schools that had been closed to avoid desegregation).
180. A conventional attack on the constitutionality of a legislative classification might
present such an occasion. Less conventionally, a class action might be brought against a
group of federal officers whose responsibilities extended to such subjects as hunger, housing,
or job training. A court would need to identify the plaintiff class by working definitions of
chronic unemployment and welfare dependence. Once a court issued its declaratory judg-
ment, the defendant officials might be ordered to propose their own remedial plans. If Con-
gress should insist that state governments participate in any such remedial efforts, it would
have ample powers to do so under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
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gested'5 ' that the courts could well begin with hunger, a problem
the nation had largely solved by 1980 and then allowed to re-
turn.2 Here, there is no need for a judge to canvass all the theo-
retical possibilities for solving a "polycentric" problem like pov-
erty. 3 Before 1980, the national government itself not only had
recognized our common responsibility to feed the hungry, but had
adopted programs that did so. In seeking to respond to the govern-
ment's abdication of responsibility, a judge could order the govern-
ment either to restore the programs that previously succeeded or
to adopt other workable programs of the government's own devise.
Courts will derive judicial standards for effectuating the principle
of equal citizenship in the poverty area almost certainly from gov-
ernment's own past assessments of basic need.'84
181. Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 1103 (1986). Professor Black's doctrinal argument centers on a duty of Congress to
provide for the general welfare (derived from article I and the preamble, with lateral sup-
port from the Declaration of Independence), and a corresponding right, recognition of which
lies within the range of judicial authority permissible under the ninth amendment. Peter
Edelman has suggested several alternative constitutional arguments for "a right to mini-
mum income." Edelman, supra note 23, at 23-48. My own doctrinal view centers on the
fourteenth amendment; hunger is utterly inconsistent with the status of equal citizenship.
182. See M. KATZ, supra note 7, at 265-66; S. LEVITAN, supra note 10, at 80-81; PHYSI-
CIANS' TASK FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA, HUNGER IN AMERICA: THE GROWING EPIDEMIC
(1985).
183. Owen Fiss has properly cautioned that having courts act as "the primary redistribu-
tive agency" of resources would be "at odds with our democratic traditions." 0. Fiss, supra
note 30, at 146. The equal citizenship principle calls for no such thing. The difference be-
tween the total cost of existing legislative programs to relieve conditions of poverty and the
total cost of such programs, given a serious judicial concern for the effects of marginality on
citizenship, would amount to a tiny fraction of our public expenditures.
184. See Michelman, supra note 99, at 39-59; Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitu-
tional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659. Judge Bork's criticism suggests that Michelman
has proposed something of a constitutional ratchet: that an anti-poverty law, once in place,
never can be repealed. See Bork, supra note 102, at 696. I do not so understand Michelman,
but in any case the criticism has no relevance to the equal citizenship principle. That princi-
ple stands on its own; irrespective of prior legislative action, some conditions of poverty
have the effect of excluding people from membership. In resolving the remedial issues raised
by the stopping-place problem, judges can appropriately seek guidance in present or prior
legislative definitions of need.
Further guidance may come from the state courts. Litigation to aid the homeless, for
example, seems an apt avenue for the development of state law expanding our conceptual
horizons about government responsibility. See, e.g., Blasi, Litigation on Behalf of the
Homeless: Systematic Approaches, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 137 (1987); Chackes,
Sheltering the Homeless: Judicial Enforcement of Governmental Duties to the Poor, 31
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 155 (1987); Connell, A Right to Emergency Shelter for the
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As Dandridge v. Williams and Plyler v. Doe illustrate, presently
existing government programs can also identify standards of need.
Here, too, a court is not left at sea in specifying the particularized
demands of the principle of equal citizenship. The complaint is
that government is providing people generally some vital neces-
sity-be it medical care8 5 or basic education 80  or food
stamps 57-- but has excluded a group of people without offering
substantial justification for the exclusion. We have come full circle
to the case of Ruth Jefferson.
Troublesome questions remain in bringing the judicial power to
bear on the problem of marginalizing poverty. What kinds of want
are dehumanizing, and what kinds are tolerable in a society that
leaves most of its resource allocations to marketplace decisions?
There is challenge in questions like these, but the challenge is no
greater than those presented by other constitutional issues that
have a more familiar ring. What kinds of police behavior amount
to unreasonable searches and seizures? How much government reg-
ulation of the use of property is allowable before the regulation
amounts to a "taking"? Constitutional questions normally turn on
matters of degree; the challenge in all these questions is the chal-
lenge of judgment. No one thinks the courts alone are capable of
solving the problem of marginalizing poverty. Yet they do have a
role in keeping pressure on government to fulfill the responsibility
we all share for affording every citizen the resources necessary to
be a participating member of our society.
What, then, of Tally Jackson himself? Even in the life of a single
individual it is no easy thing to replace dependence with resolve, to
create hope from despair. When hopelessness touches groups of
people, the remedial difficulties increase in complexity by geomet-
ric progression. When very large numbers of people feed each
Homeless Under the New Jersey Constitution, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 765 (1987); Note, Homeless
Families: Do They Have a Right to Integrity?, 35 UCLA L. REV. 159, 196-201 (1987). One
important by-product of such litigation is the raising of public consciousness-which, in
turn, can affect judicial attitudes at the highest level. See Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of
Shelter for the Poor, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1987).
185. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
186. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
187. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
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others' dependence and desperation, the task of community recla-
mation looks forbidding. 88 No lack of remedial proposals exists;
indeed, one of the main complications is that the proposals point
in different directions. s9 Through all the dispute, we find broad
agreement on two interrelated needs: the need for jobs, and the
need to break the cycle of welfare dependency. The dispute about
remedy remains, however, and it is, indeed, polycentric. Shall we
address these needs by adopting family assistance plans that erase
the old morality-laden boundaries between poor people who are
"deserving" and "undeserving," and between programs of "insur-
ance" (middle-class programs like Social Security) and "welfare"
(needs-based relief)? By drastically reducing welfare benefits to
promote self-help? 90 By conditioning welfare payments on job
training or efforts to find work? By establishing government em-
ployment or public works programs? 9' Enterprise zones? Pro-
grams to take young people out of the ghetto?'92
Whatever may be your preferred answers to these questions,
there are distinct limits on the possibility that those answers will
be put into operation in programs initiated by the judiciary. Unless
the judges use a legislative standard of need, as in Plyler, it is real-
istic to expect them mainly to respond to politics, and only rarely
to take initiatives of their own. Even in the years since Chief Jus-
tice Warren's retirement, the Supreme Court has proved itself a
willing partner in egalitarian reform when Congress takes the lead.
On the whole, the Court has given generous interpretations to the
federal civil rights laws.'9" The lower federal courts, too, have been
able to build significant new substantive doctrine, once Congress
188. On the effects of concentration of large numbers of marginalized blacks, see W. WIL-
SON, supra note 10, at 34-62; Hacker, American Apartheid, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 3,
1987, at 26.
189. Lemann summarizes the types of proposals that have had recent vogue. Lemann,
supra note 110, at 65-68.
190. See C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980, at 227-33
(1984).
191. See M. HARRINGTON, supra note 69, at 230-55. On the historic role of government
employment in reducing black unemployment, see R. McGAHEY & J. JEFFRIES, MINORITIES
AND THE LABOR MARK . TWENTY YEARS OF MISGUIDED POLICY 42-49 (1985).
192. See Lemann, supra note 110, at 66-68.
193. See K. KARST, supra note 5, ch. 9; Fiss, Racial Discrimination, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1500 (1986).
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provides the necessary statutory base.19 Absent legislative guid-
ance or the political support of Congress, however, the courts have
been disinclined to act on their own, in the name of the Constitu-
tion, to establish affirmative duties to the poor.
One claim that current constitutional doctrine does support is
the equalization of public resources available for ghetto schools,
health services, and housing.195 Serious efforts toward even that
much equalizing would be a step forward, and Plyler v. Doe shows
how some marginalizing forms of poverty are the proper concern of
constitutional law. Finally, the Supreme Court may validate some
claims of poor people in the name of specific constitutional guaran-
tees outside the domain of equal protection doctrine, as it has done
in the criminal justice area and more broadly in the area now la-
beled "access to the courts."19 Still, one must concede that the
nation's Tally Jacksons are unlikely to find comprehensive judicial
remedies for the multifold harms that are their inheritance from
the racial caste system.
Yet the principle of equal citizenship is not just a legal doctrine.
Citizens-all of us-have responsibilities to each other beyond
those that are enforceable in court. In particular, we have the re-
sponsibility to see that no one gets left out of the public life of the
community. No doubt, our legislative bodies, from the Congress
down to the local zoning board, are arenas where citizens who want
to fulfill our common responsibilities to the marginalized poor will
have to focus much of their effort. Reclaiming real citizenship for
the ghetto's marginalized residents will require a combination of
political mobilization, legislative support, self-help, and the partic-
ipation of public and private institutions covering a broad spec-
194. On sexual harassment as employment discrimination, see C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). On generous judi-
cial interpretations of federal fair housing laws, see Calmore, Exploring the Significance of
Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REv. 201, 237-38 & n.183 (1982).
195. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Horowitz, Unseparate But Une-
qual-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA
L. REV. 1147 (1966).
196. For discussion and references, see Karst, supra note 1, at 29-31. More recent deci-
sions include Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (prisoner's right to assistance in prepar-
ing and filing legal papers) and Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent's right to a
blood test for resolution of paternity).
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trum. Those efforts need the cooperation of a diverse set of actors,
including the residents of the ghettos and the whites who govern
many of the relevant institutions. Most importantly, middle-class
blacks will be needed to provide leadership and to do the work of
cultural and political brokers.19 7
Here the judiciary can make its own distinctive contribution to
community reclamation, for this is one context in which the
achievement of welfare goals will depend on the validation of
claims to equal status. The black people who are most race-con-
scious, and who care the most about equal treatment, are those
who have regular contact with whites. 98 If middle-class black peo-
ple are to play their indispensable part in reclaiming citizenship
for blacks who are impoverished and marginalized, they will need
assurance that they are not just being used in a pacification pro-
gram-that the goal really is an enlarged community of equal citi-
zens. Our courts can help provide that assurance, but in doing so
they will need to reexamine the constitutional doctrines assigning
responsibility for racial wrongs. Any effective judicial response to
these harms will recognize the central importance of remedies that
take account of racial groups.
From the beginning of the civil rights era, the Justices of the
Supreme Court have understood that their actions teach lessons,
not only to black people but to whites as well. 9 Consider Brown v.
Board of Education0 0 itself: measured by the actual desegregation
of schools, the decision was, at best, a mixed success. Brown was
never just a case about schools; it was, and still is, our nation's
single most authoritative statement that a racial caste system is
constitutionally and morally impermissible. Brown's most impor-
tant contribution to American public life was not the specific in-
junctive relief it authorized but its declaration that school segrega-
tion denied the equal protection of the laws.
Today, with the benefit of a generation's experience, one can see
that status harms and material harms are not separate; each com-
pounds the other. The Supreme Court, in other words, has a new
197. See Calmore, supra note 194, at 238-40.
198. See, e.g., Lemann, supra note 110, at 59.
199. On the judiciary's teaching role, see Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of
the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984).
200. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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lesson to teach: that the eradication of racial caste will require us
to do more than discard the laws that impose formal inequality. In
the next generation the Court has no task more urgent than to
teach the lessons that connect citizenship with responsibility, the
lessons of a community that will embrace Tally Jackson's
grandchildren.
